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Abstract—This paper is the result of a two month research
internship on the topic of library version identification. In this
paper, ideas and techniques from literature in the area of
binary comparison and fingerprinting are outlined and applied
to the problem of (version) identification of shared libraries
and of libraries within statically linked binary executables. Six
comparison techniques are chosen and implemented in an open-
source tool which in turn makes use of the open-source radare2
framework for signature generation. The effectiveness of the
techniques is empirically analyzed by comparing both artificial
and real sample files against a reference dataset of multiple
versions of dozens of libraries. The results show that out of
these techniques, readable string–based techniques perform the
best and that one of these techniques correctly identifies multiple
libraries contained in a stripped statically linked executable file.
I. INTRODUCTION
When scrutinizing the security of an embedded device, one
of the things an analyst looks for are vulnerabilities in the
collection of executables and shared libraries contained in
the device’s firmware image. Often, these shared libraries are
common, non-proprietary utility libraries and the executables
will have often been statically linked against such libraries.
A vulnerability in one of these libraries could lead to ex-
ploitation of the device, especially when considering that these
libraries often process user controlled data (e.g. for multimedia
decoding or compression). Some of these libraries have a
history of vulnerable versions for which there are known
exploits. The task of exploitation could therefore be as simple
as determining the exact version or variant of each library and
– if a vulnerable version is found – using public vulnerability
information to devise an exploit for an executable file that
makes use of the vulnerable library.
This paper focuses on a specific aspect of this process:
the problem of automatically identifying the version of a
given shared library file. Six techniques of three different
signature types have are implemented in an experimental open-
source tool in order to evaluate their effectiveness. Preliminary
experiments are also performed on the applicability of these
techniques on the harder problem of identifying libraries
in statically linked executables. Samples and corresponding
reference libraries of both ARM and MIPS architectures are
used for these experiments.
II. RELATED WORK
Intuitively, the identification problem as described above –
at least the shared library identification variant – comes down
to the problem of determining executable object similarity.
After all, in order to identify the best matching library version
to some sample file, one has to calculate some metric of
similarity between the sample file and each version of each
reference library. In the case of statically linked executables,
this will not result in matches of (close to) 100% similarity,
but it will give an indication of the amount of overlap between
a library version and the sample file, which might be an
indicator for the probability that that library (version) is
actually contained inside the sample file.
A structural way to perform such an executable object
comparison was laid out by Dullien and Rolles in [4]. They
reduce it to the problem of creating a (fuzzy) graph isomor-
phism between control-flow graphs (CFGs) of both executable
objects. Specifically, they treat an executable object as a graph
of graphs, i.e. a function callgraph where each of the nodes –
i.e. each function – contains that function’s control-flow graph
which in turn has basic-blocks as its nodes. Metrics are defined
to determine basic-block and function similarity, allowing a
full isomorphism to be created.
Building on these techniques and specifically focusing on
polymorphic worm detection, the authors in [8] apply a
fingerprinting technique on a canonical representation of k-
subgraphs of a CFG, allowing quick (partial) matching of
a sample file. Following up on this, Cesare and Xiang [2]
implement a complete malware classification system which
among other things translates full CFGs into strings based on a
specific grammar, allowing them to be compared quickly using
Levenshtein distance (i.e. edit distance). Similarly, Koret’s
open source malware clustering toolkit Cosa Nostra repre-
sents CFGs as prime products determined by the cyclomatic
complexity values of functions, allowing for permutation-
independent fuzzy comparisons [7].
Doing away with graph-theoretic techniques, Gheorghescu
proposes three classification methods on the flat list of basic-
blocks of an executable object, the most innovative of which
uses Bloom filters (see section IV-B) to achieve a fixed small
signature size [5].
2Taking an entirely different approach, Tian et al. propose a
system for malware classification that achieves high accuracy
by using the printable strings from a sample as an input for
several classification algorithms including Bayesian and K-
nearest neighbour [9].
The work presented in this paper is a preliminary ex-
ploration of the effectiveness of applying variants of the
above-mentioned techniques to the problem of library version
identification.
III. CFG GENERATION TOOLS
To perform the non-string based comparison techniques
mentioned in section II (i.e. all but the system by Tian et al.),
we first need to construct the CFGs of all of the functions in
the executable objects in question. This requires disassembling
the objects and using knowledge of the instruction set and
calling conventions in order to build a directed graph of the
control flow between basic-blocks. Several pieces of software
can perform this task, the most popular of which is the
proprietary IDA Pro, which is easily scriptable and is often
used for similar purposes. An interesting alternative for our
purpose however is the open source binary analysis framework
angr [7]. Like IDA Pro, it supports many architectures and
formats and in addition to its ability to generate accurate CFGs
using symbolic execution, it has built-in binary comparison
functionality based on [4] (see section IV-A). Another alter-
native is the radare2 reverse engineering framework. It too
has built-in support for (static) CFG generation and binary
comparison (see section IV-A). Additionally, it supports even
more architectures than angr and has bindings for almost any
language. In practice, it also turns out to be faster than angr in
static analysis tasks. For this reason radare2 was used in lieu
of angr for the final iteration of this project as is explained in
more detail in section IV-A.
IV. TECHNIQUES
From the related work discussed in section II we can
distill multiple techniques of creating executable object signa-
tures (i.e. fingerprints) and multiple techniques of comparing
those signatures. Three of these combinations are detailed
in this section: basic block hash comparison using Bloom
filters (section IV-B), several cyclomatic complexity–based
techniques (section IV-C) and several string-based techniques
(section IV-D). Before discussing these techniques, we must
however understand why they are useful, especially when
compared with graph isomorphism-based techniques. This is
explained in section IV-A.
A. Graph isomorphisms
While angr has the ability to perform several static analy-
sis techniques, its main purpose is symbolic execution. For
generating the CFG of an executable object, it offers two
methods: CFGAccurate and CFGFast. The former uses
symbolic execution of basic-blocks to accurately determine
all of the possible control-flow paths, while the latter uses a
more traditional heuristics-based approach. The result of either
can be passed to angr’s BinDiff analysis method which
is named after commercial software of the same name by
Zynamics [10]. Just like its namesake, it implements the graph
isomorphism technique from [4].
For our purposes, we can use these methods to create a
graph isomorphism between two potentially similar libraries.
A similarity measure can then be derived from the number of
identical or almost identical functions and basic-blocks.
However, such an isomorphism has to be created for every
reference file (i.e. every library version to compare against).
Ideally we would want to compare a sample against every
version of every library in our reference set, and possibly even
against compilations of the same version by different com-
pilers, or with varying optimization levels or other compiler
flags1. This means that the number of isomorphism calcula-
tions that needs to be done for one sample is really high and
will grow quickly (but linearly) with added reference libraries.
Additionally, the CFG information (i.e. the whole graph and
associated data) needed by angr’s BinDiff needs to be pre-
calculated and stored for each one of these reference files and
loaded into memory when the comparison is performed.
As it turns out, both of these factors make angr a less than
ideal framework for our purpose. The data structure produced
by its CFG generation methods is large and contains data un-
needed for the BinDiff method. Additionally, the BinDiff
method makes heavy use of angr’s lifting functionality to
lift machine code to an intermediate representation (using
PyVEX), which takes up most of the method’s long execution
time. An attempt was made to mitigate these problems by
stripping down both the CFG datastructure and simplifying
BinDiff by performing the lifting at CFG generation time.
This resulted in a small improvement but the core problems
of heavy memory usage and long computation times remain.
Both of these are however not necessarily a problem of angr
but of the graph isomorphism-based algorithm in general. The
radiff2 tool of radare2 also implements the algorithm from
Dullien and Rolles [4] and achieves similar performance. It
becomes clear why [2] and [8] implement more efficient CFG
fingerprinting techniques: graph isomorphisms are generally
too slow for a one-to-many comparison. This is especially true
for angr’s implementation which is slowed down by operations
like the lifting described above. This is not surprising however,
because angr is mainly intended to be used interactively on
very small (and often artificial) samples.
For these reasons, both the original and the optimized
version of angr’s BinDiff were not integrated into the
library identification tool. They are not practically usable with
a reference database of a few hundred samples2 and will
therefore not scale to much larger databases that could be used
in practice.
1Optimistically, such compiler and flag differences would be abstracted
away by techniques such as [4] but as those authors themselves note, modern
optimizing compilers can make drastic changes to assembly output depending
on compiler flags and other variables.
2A single comparison with angr’s BinDiff can take up to a minute for
large reference libraries and a lot longer for even larger samples.
3B. Basic-block matching using Bloom filters
Clearly we need signatures that are both quicker to com-
pare against and have a smaller footprint than a full CFG.
Gheorghescu’s Bloom filter approach [5] satisfies these re-
quirements. The technique consists of creating a fixed size
Bloom filter3 [1] for each reference object and inserting into
it the hashes of all of that file’s basic-blocks. It is not specified
exactly what the input to the filter’s hash function is, but
presumably the raw byte code of a basic-block is used. We
can now obtain a similarity ratio between files by calculating
the Jaccard index (or similarity coefficient) of the sets of
bits in their Bloom filters, i.e. for filters x and y, calculate
d(x, y) = Σi(xi ∧ yi)/Σi(xi ∨ yi). Because the run time of
element insertion and look-up in a Bloom filter are both O(1),
this makes the time complexity of signature generation linear
in file size. More importantly, signature comparison is constant
in the size of the Bloom filter.
We can implement this technique by using radare2 to obtain
basic-block information. Specifically, we can use the type label
it gives to every instruction in place of the instruction byte
code itself. This way, we abstract away differences in register
allocation and constants. The hash of basic-block B consisting
of instructions {b1, ..., bn} is then constructed as follows:
h(B) = crc32(type(b0) || type(b1) || ... || type(bn))
For a Bloom filter of size m bits, the log2(m) least significant
bits of the hash output are used as an index. A value of m =
215 is used in this implementation.
C. Function matching using cyclomatic complexity
Another way to create really small signatures (i.e. in the
order of O(log n) in the file-size) of executable objects is by
calculating and comparing the cyclomatic complexity values of
their containing functions. The cyclomatic complexity Mf of
a function f whose CFG contains Nf nodes (i.e. basic-blocks)
and Ef edges is usually defined as: Mf = Ef −Nf + 2. In
the implementation of this technique by Koret in the Cosa
Nostra framework, the signature of an executable object is
then calculated by taking the product of primes, indexed by
the cyclomatic complexity of each function [7]. In other words,
if pn denotes the nth prime, the file signature is calculated by:
sig(file) =
∏
f∈file
pMf
Two of these signatures or fuzzy hashes can then be
compared by factoring them and counting the number of
differing factors between them. This concept of using small
primes products to determine if one feature-set is (almost) a
permutation of another was introduced by Dullien and Rolles
[4]. In their algorithm it is instead used on sets of instructions
for determining code similarity as a step in finding a graph
isomorphism.
Retrieving the needed information to generate such signa-
tures is trivial when using radare2. After analysing a file it
3Bloom filter: a fixed size bit-array populated by ones at positions corre-
sponding to the hashes of its containing elements. It is normally used as a
data structure for fast probablistic element look-up.
provides the cyclomatic complexity value as the cc attribute
of every function in the output of the aflj command. Storing
not only the prime product but also the list of cc values
(or the list of prime factors, as used for technique cc3 in
our tool) for every reference file saves a factoring step and
allows us to perform additional types of comparison on them.
For this project, two additional comparison techniques were
implemented on the list of cc values: Levenshtein distance
(permutation-sensitive) as technique cc1 and set similarity
(permutation-insensitive) as technique cc2.
D. Printable strings matching
Every non-trivial executable object contains a set of print-
able strings. These sets often consist of error messages,
copyright or usage information, but also of strings for internal
use like file content in media parsing or generation libraries.
Additionally, symbol tables can be present, containing function
or object names. Tian et al. show that such a list of strings
can be an accurate signature of an executable object when
used for malware classification using various machine learning
algorithms [9]. However, one wonders if it is possible to
forgo such algorithms and instead perform a fuzzy comparison
using Levenshtein distance, or even more trivial, a simple set
difference calculation.
Retrieving the printable strings from an executable object
is a trivial operation. The basic functionality of the Unix
strings command can be replicated in less than 50 lines
of code. As a trade-off, the resulting signature (i.e. the list of
strings) is not as small as those in the previous two techniques,
nor is it constant in size. It is however never bigger than the
executable object itself (which can be the case when using
angr’s BinDiff comparison method). On these signatures,
two comparison techniques are implemented and tested:
• Fuzzy string matching by calculating the Levenshtein
distance on two sorted and concatenated lists of strings. In
other words, calculate acat and bcat as the concatenations
of all of the strings from the sample and the reference
file respectively, before calculating the similarity ratio as
follows:
r = 1−
Levenshtein(acat, bcat)
max(|acat|, |bcat|)
This metric handles both differences within strings and
differences between the lists of strings, i.e. added or
removed strings. In the tool, this is implemented as
technique str1.
• Exact position-sensitive string matching using the simi-
larity between two sets of strings. Specifically, the simi-
larity ratio between two string sets A and B is calculated
as:
r =
|A ∪B|
|A ∩B|
This will give the Jaccard index of the sets, indicating
the ratio of strings that occur in both the sample and the
reference file versus all of the strings that occur in either
file. This is implemented as technique str2.
4V. THE LIBRARY IDENTIFICATION TOOL
The aforementioned techniques (sections IV-B - IV-D) have
been implemented into an experimental open-source library
identification tool4. It is written in Python, making use of
several open-source packages including the r2pipe package
for communicating with a radare2 instance during signature
generation. Architecturally, the tool is composed of a main
file, library_identification.py, which contains the
LibraryFile and ReferenceDB classes which respec-
tively implement an abstraction for shared library files, and
a manager for library signature databases. These classes are
used by the tool’s two front-end scripts: identify.py and
generate_db.py.
Six signature comparison techniques are implemented in
identify.py as functions with a standardised interface,
allowing them to be passed as function pointers to helper
functions. Table I shows all of these comparison functions
with descriptions of what they do.
VI. REFERENCE DATASET
The implemented techniques have been tested on both types
of samples: shared library files and statically linked exe-
cutables. For the latter category, both real and semi-artificial
samples were picked. Information about these samples and the
results obtained from them can be found in section VII.
To provide the best testing scenario, a database of many
library version signatures is needed. For the experiments in
this paper, a database was constructed using a custom tool that
downloads and cross-compiles as many versions as possible
of a given open-source library. This was done by making
use of the build instructions in PKGBUILD files provided for
each package in the Arch Linux repositories5. The result after
applying this tool to a selection of common libraries and other
packages starting with lib is a set of more than 60 libraries
for ARM and MIPS, each with anywhere between 1 and 40
versions, but with an average of about 5. The full dataset used
in the experiments is provided in appendix A.
VII. RESULTS
In the sections below, the results of several experiments
are shown. Section VII-A details the results of several ex-
periments related to the identification of shared libraries,
while section VII-B deals with the secondary goal of version
identification of libraries contained within statically linked
binaries.
A. Identifying shared libraries
This section contains explanations and the results of several
experiments with shared libraries as the sample files.
4https://github.com/Riscure/Library-Identification/
5This approach was preferred over a binary source (e.g. Debian package
archives) because it allows us to create binaries of old library versions without
future security patches being applied.
1) Speed: After running the tool on various samples, the
first thing that stands out is the major difference in speed
between the techniques. Table II shows the duration of using
each technique to compare a sample to 188 references (the
total amount of library versions in the dataset for the MIPS
architecture). We can see that str1 — the fuzzy string
matching technique — performs the slowest, while cc1 and
cc2 perform the fastest. In fact, for all of the samples tested,
fuzzy string matching is slower than cc1 and cc2 by a factor
of more than a thousand. The third cyclomatic complexity-
based technique — cc3— is much slower than the other two.
This is to be expected because it employs a prime factorisa-
tion algorithm which is relatively computationally expensive.
Lastly, we observe that the Bloom filter comparison algorithm
takes more time than than cc1 and cc2, but still finishes
in well under a second on our database of 188 references.
More importantly, its running time varies very little between
the different samples and does not depend on their size.
2) Version identification: When the identification tool is
applied to a sample library version of which the signature is
present in the reference database, all six techniques produce
the same version as a match with 100% similarity, as would be
expected. More interestingly, when comparing a sample library
version to other versions of the same library, we see that with
most techniques, the versions with the highest similarity scores
are closest in version to the sample. An example of this is
shown in table III. Here, libjpeg version 9.2.0 is compared to
all libjpeg versions in the database. We see that the nearest
version — 9.1.0 — is given the second-highest similarity
score by all the techniques. In fact, for all techniques except
for cc2, the sorted list of versions by similarity score is in
perfect chronological order. Assuming that each version is
based on the previous version and no major rewrites were
performed, this result is entirely as expected. The fact that in
this case, all techniques give a similarity score of 93+% to
the version nearest to the sample, means that even if the exact
version of the sample is not in the reference database, a good
approximation of its version will still be returned.
3) False positives: While a good comparison technique
for our purpose should give a high similarity score to close
versions of the same library, this is not the only metric
of effectiveness. In table IV, another metric is shown: the
similarity score of the highest rating library version that is not
a version of the same library as the sample. In other words,
all results of the correct library are ignored, and the highest
remaining similarity score is recorded. Since these results
are by definition not matches or near-matches6, the recorded
scores should be low. In practice, str2 performs really
well in this regard: for all samples in table IV, the highest
“false positive” similarity score is below 9%, which is low
compared to the 20+% values returned by other techniques.
The cyclomatic complexity–based techniques perform badly
because the probability that functions from unrelated libraries
have the same cyclomatic complexity value is high, especially
for large libraries. This is an expected trade-off of the small
6This is assumed to be true in this dataset. In general, libraries could share
code or be forked from each other, in which case high similarity ratings could
be legitimate.
5Function name Short name Description
compare_bb_hash_bloomfilter bloom Compares the sample and the reference by comparing the
Bloom filter signatures of each using the Jaccard index.
compare_cc_list_levenshtein cc1 Compares the cyclomatic complexity values of all functions
in the sample with those of all functions in the reference by
taking the Levenshtein distance between these lists.
compare_cc_list_set_union cc2 Performs a permutation-independent comparison between the
lists of cyclomatic complexity values of both the sample and
the reference by treating both as sets and calculating the
overlap between these sets using the Jaccard index.
compare_cc_spp cc3 Compares the cyclomatic complexity values of the functions
in the sample and the reference by factoring the small prime
products of each and determining the number of matching
factors.
compare_strings_concat_levenshtein str1 Performs a fuzzy string and string list comparison by taking
the Levenshtein distance between the concatenations of the
lists of strings in both the sample and the reference.
compare_strings_set_union str2 Performs an exact, permutation-independent string list com-
parison by treating the lists of strings in both the sample and
the reference as sets and calculating the overlap between these
sets using the Jaccard index.
Table I: Implemented comparison techniques
Sample library str1 str2 cc1 cc2 cc3 bloom
libpng 1.6.15 721 KB 91903 ms 47 ms 9 ms 15 ms 13095 ms 304 ms
libz 1.1.3 208 KB 16257 ms 28 ms 5 ms 9 ms 13210 ms 364 ms
curl 7.43.0 380 KB 146191 ms 80 ms 66 ms 19 ms 13437 ms 309 ms
bzip2 1.0.6-5 157 KB 18625 ms 28 ms 5 ms 10 ms 13152 ms 348 ms
Table II: Averaged duration of the comparison of each sample against 188 MIPS library versions on a Core i7 laptop.
Reference library str1 str2 cc1 cc2 cc3 bloom
libjpeg 9.2.0 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
libjpeg 9.1.0 99.97% 99.35% 98.75% 93.62% 97.49% 97.19%
libjpeg 9.0.0 99.87% 94.62% 91.41% 84.00% 90.48% 88.38%
libjpeg 8.4.0 99.39% 92.91% 89.66% 70.37% 88.09% 84.64%
libjpeg 8.3.0 99.25% 92.77% 86.83% 70.37% 86.52% 78.78%
libjpeg 8.0.2 99.24% 92.77% 86.83% 73.58% 86.52% 78.42%
libjpeg 8.0.1 99.22% 92.77% 86.21% 73.58% 86.52% 78.06%
libjpeg 8.0.0 99.20% 92.61% 86.21% 73.58% 86.52% 77.34%
libjpeg 7.0.0 95.14% 88.85% 78.37% 65.45% 78.37% 77.12%
Table III: Similarity of libjpeg.so.9.2.0 (MIPS) to other libjpeg versions.
signature size obtained with these techniques. The bloom
technique performs similarly, largely because of a similar
reason: unrelated libraries share basic-blocks that produce the
same hash. Considering the fact that the hash is made from
the list of instruction types, and that these references contain
many small basic-blocks, this was to be expected.
An outlier here is the result of bloom on libz version 1.1.3.
In this case, all non-libz library versions are given similarity
scores of less than 1%, a much better result than the others in
its column. Why only this specific library shares so little basic-
block hashes with others is unknown. One possible cause of
this could be that instructions in versions of this library are
consistently different or ordered differently from those in other
libraries, which could be explained by a different compiler or
different compiler flags being used.
B. Identifying libraries within statically linked executables
All six techniques perform well at the task of identifying
the most likely version of a shared library file. We would,
however, also like to know how well these techniques apply
to the problem of identifying libraries inside statically linked
executables. In order to evaluate this, the tool was run on
both artificial and real-world statically linked executables. The
results of which are detailed here.
Firstly, the sample code provided by libjpeg in example.c
was used to create a dummy program that calls the
6Sample library str1 str2 cc1 cc2 cc3 bloom
libpng 1.6.15 23.16% 3.96% 30.00% 54.29% 64.15% 27.78%
libz 1.1.3 20.19% 7.71% 29.01% 69.57% 46.15% 0.97%
curl 7.43.0 22.28% 2.89% 37.30% 62.12% 73.40% 38.89%
bzip2 1.0.6-5 20.17% 8.27% 29.63% 57.58% 33.93% 31.82%
Table IV: Similarity of the highest matching version of an incorrect library.
read_JPEG_file and write_JPEG_file functions.
Nine samples were created by statically linking this program
with nine different versions of libjpeg. Each sample was
stripped of symbols before performing the experiments. Table
V shows for each combination of sample and technique,
whether the correct libjpeg version (the one that the sample
was linked with) is the top result (i.e. whether it has the highest
similarity score out of all the references).
In the table, we can see that str2 is the only technique that
consistently gives the highest similarity score to the correct
library version. The fuzzy string comparison technique, str1,
performs almost as well but strangely produces version 7.0.0
for the sample which was linked to libjpeg version 8.0.0.
Of course, when interpreting the program output in this
manner, we assume that the sample file is statically linked
to exactly one library and that this library is contained in
the reference database. A more complex scenario would be a
sample that is statically linked against multiple libraries. One
such a sample is the statically linked version of the castget
program, an open source podcast downloader7. Three libraries
are statically linked into this relatively large (1.7MB) binary:
curl (7.50.0), libxml2 (2.8.0) and id3lib (3.8.3). Because two
out of three of these libraries are in the reference database –
curl and id3lib – it makes for a good real-world test case.
Looking at the results, we see that str2 is the only
technique where the two correct matches have the highest
similarity scores, with a significant percentage drop afterwards
(i.e. from 11.13% for id3lib to 2.51% for libmp4v2). The
str2 technique has matched the correct version of curl but
not of id3lib, where it matched version 3.8.0 instead of 3.8.3,
the actual version contained in the sample. This was however
entirely expected, because version 3.8.0 is the only reference
version for id3lib in the database.
VIII. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST OBFUSCATION
While some of the techniques are clearly more effective
than others when applied to the samples above, it is also good
to consider their robustness against intentional and uninten-
tional obfuscation in more obscure scenarios. The authors of
firmware images containing shared libraries or statically linked
executables might exploit weaknesses of the identification
techniques in order to make it as difficult as possible for an
analyst to determine the version of these libraries. A clear
example of such a countermeasure is string obfuscation. There
exists a wide range of techniques for string obfuscation – rang-
ing from trivial transformations to cryptographic techniques –
but even the simplest of these will render str1 and str2
fruitless. On the other hand, the cyclomatic complexity and
7From http://castget.johndal.com/
basic-block–based techniques are sensitive to changes to the
CFG structure or individual instructions which can be caused
by (heavy) compile-time optimization or intentional code
obfuscation. In such situations, the string-based techniques are
the most robust.
While such countermeasures are important to keep in mind,
the best-case scenario of a non-optimized and non-obfuscated
sample was assumed during this project. Certainly, it is much
more straight-forward for a firmware-creator to keep their
included open-source libraries up to date than to attempt
to obfuscate them to hide the fact that they are out of
date. Therefore one would not expect to come across many
intentionally obfuscated open-source libraries in practice.
Another factor that could cause the string-based techniques
to perform less well is the fact that the number of strings in
libraries is not necessarily related to their size, i.e. there could
be low-level libraries that barely contain any (unique) strings,
causing low similarity scores and relatively high false-positive
scores.
IX. FUTURE WORK
The work presented in this paper only scratches the surface
of what could be possible in terms of library version iden-
tification using existing fingerprinting and binary comparison
techniques. The six implemented techniques represent several
combinations of fingerprint creation and fingerprint compar-
ison techniques, but more combinations and variations are
possible. Specifically, more advanced approaches like the use
of machine learning algorithms [9] could yield better results.
The biggest problem with the current approach is that all
techniques compare the entire contents of the sample file to
the entire contents of reference files, resulting in absolute
rather than relative similarity scores. These are useful when the
sample is a shared library file but less so for statically linked
executables, especially when these contain multiple linked
libraries, as seen in table VI. In such cases, one might want to
first identify which parts of the executable file are library code
at all and possibly even apply fingerprinting techniques on a
per-function basis9. Research is required to determine whether
or not such solutions are feasible and more effective.
More generally, other approaches to this problem could be
the use of symbolic execution (i.e. comparing functions or
basic-blocks by their constraints) or visualisation [3] using
image processing techniques.
9IDA’s F.L.I.R.T.[6] provides library function identification using small
fingerprints, but it is rather fragile, and geared more towards manual reverse-
engineering and small sets of libraries.
7Sample file str1 str2 cc1 cc2 cc3 bloom
jpeg_7.0.0_example_static yes yes yes yes yes yes
jpeg_8.0.0_example_static (7.0.0) yes (8.0.1) no (multiple) (multiple)
jpeg_8.0.1_example_static yes yes yes no yes yes
jpeg_8.0.2_example_static yes yes (multiple) no (multiple) (multiple)
jpeg_8.3.0_example_static yes yes yes no (8.0.1) (8.0.1)
jpeg_8.4.0_example_static yes yes (8.3.0) no (multiple) (multiple)
jpeg_9.0.0_example_static yes yes (8.3.0) yes (multiple) (7.0.0)
jpeg_9.1.0_example_static yes yes (multiple) yes yes yes
jpeg_9.2.0_example_static yes yes (multiple) (multiple) yes yes
Table V: Does the correct libjpeg version have the highest similarity rating when comparing a statically linked executable
against 188 references? “yes”: the correct libjpeg version has the highest similarity score; “no”: a different library has the
highest similarity score; “(n)”: version n of libjpeg has the highest similarity score; “(multiple)”: several versions of libjpeg
have a shared highest similarity score.
Library Version Similarity
libisoburn 1.4.0 18.03%
curl 7.50.0 17.85%
libisofs 1.4.6 16.95%
libarchive 3.2.2 16.53%
libexif 0.6.21 14.93%
(a) str1
Library Version Similarity
curl 7.50.0 18.91%
id3lib 3.8.0 11.13%
libmp4v2 2.0.0 2.51%
libebml 1.3.1 1.48%
libburn 1.2.2 1.37%
(b) str2
Library Version Similarity
libmp4v2 2.0.0 44.98%
libisofs 1.4.2 43.39%
libarchive 3.2.1 30.36%
libisoburn 1.3.6 30.19%
curl 7.37.1 29.74%
(c) cc1
Library Version Similarity
libisoburn 1.4.6 56.07%
libarchive 3.2.0 50.47%
opus 1.1.3 46.46%
libpng 1.5.13 45.92%
libmodplug 0.8.7 45.87%
(d) cc2
Library Version Similarity
libisofs 1.4.0 53.94%
libarchive 3.2.0 42.94%
libisoburn 1.4.6 42.94%
curl 7.37.1 31.90%
libvisual 0.4.0 29.31%
(e) cc3
Library Version Similarity
libdca 0.0.5 60.71%
libsamplerate 0.1.3 51.72%
libmspack 0.0.2...8 37.50%
libupnp 1.6.18 37.50%
bzip2 1.0.6 35.56%
(f) bloom
Table VI: Top 5 distinct matched libraries for the castget ARM sample. Each table shows the result for a single technique.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this project, six comparison techniques were detailed and
implemented, inspired by existing research in the areas of
executable file comparison and fingerprinting. Out of these
techniques, the exact set-based readable string comparison
technique, str2, performed the best. In terms of effective-
ness it (empirically) outperforms all others, most notably by
correctly assigning relatively high similarity scores to libraries
contained inside a statically linked executable, and low scores
to others. Using the output of this technique – given an
exhaustive reference database – an analyst is able to more
quickly determine (the versions of) libraries contained in
statically linked executables.
While str2 performs well in the the tested scenarios, it is
acknowledged that the kind of signature it uses to recognize
a library (i.e. the list of printable strings in the file’s data) is
fragile in the sense that it can easily be obfuscated. This is
however true for all techniques, to a lesser degree.
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APPENDIX
This appendix shows the contents of the reference database
used for the experiments in this paper. Library versions were
compiled for one of three architectures: X86, MIPS or ARM.
As can be seen below, not all versions of every library were
obtained for every architecture. Unless stated otherwise, the
set of reference library versions used for each experiment is
a subset of this database, as obtained by filtering this list by
the architecture of the sample file.
• attr:
– MIPS: 2.4.47-2
• bzip2:
– ARM: 1.0.4 1.0.5 1.0.6
– MIPS: 1.0.5-5 1.0.6-5
• curl:
– ARM: 7.21.4 7.21.5 7.21.6 7.21.7 7.22.0 7.23.0 7.23.1 7.24.0 7.25.0 7.26.0
7.27.0 7.28.0 7.28.1 7.29.0 7.30.0 7.31.0 7.32.0 7.33.0 7.34.0 7.35.0 7.36.0
7.37.0 7.37.1 7.38.0 7.39.0 7.40.0 7.41.0 7.42.1 7.43.0 7.44.0 7.45.0 7.46.0
7.47.0 7.47.1 7.48.0 7.49.0 7.49.1 7.50.0 7.50.1
– MIPS: 7.21.4 7.21.5 7.21.6 7.21.7 7.22.0 7.23.0 7.23.1 7.24.0 7.25.0 7.26.0
7.27.0 7.28.0 7.28.1 7.29.0 7.30.0 7.31.0 7.32.0 7.33.0 7.34.0 7.35.0 7.36.0
7.37.0 7.37.1 7.38.0 7.39.0 7.40.0 7.41.0 7.42.1 7.43.0 7.44.0 7.45.0 7.46.0
7.47.0 7.47.1 7.48.0 7.49.0 7.49.1 7.50.0 7.50.1 7.50.2 7.50.3
• flac:
– MIPS: 1.2.1 1.3.0 1.3.1
• giflib:
– MIPS: 5.0.4-2 5.0.5-1 5.0.6-1 5.1.0-1 5.1.1-1 5.1.2-1 5.1.4-1
• id3lib:
– ARM: 3.8.0
• lame:
– MIPS: 3.98.4 3.99.1 3.99.2 3.99.3 3.99.4 3.99.5 3.99
• libao:
– ARM: 0.8.8 1.0.0 1.1.0 1.2.0
• libarchive:
– ARM: 3.0.4 3.1.2 3.2.0 3.2.1 3.2.2
• libart-lgpl:
– ARM: 2.3.21
• libburn:
– ARM: 0.6.0.pl01 0.6.2.pl00 0.6.4.pl00 0.6.6.pl00 0.6.8.pl00 0.7.0.pl00
0.7.2.pl00 0.7.2.pl01 0.7.4.pl00 0.7.6.pl00 0.8.0.pl00 0.8.2.pl00 0.8.4.pl00
0.8.6.pl00 0.8.8.pl00 0.9.0.pl00 1.0.0.pl00 1.0.2.pl00 1.0.4.pl00 1.0.6.pl00
1.1.0.pl01 1.1.0 1.1.4 1.1.6 1.1.8 1.2.0 1.2.2 1.2.4 1.2.6 1.2.8 1.3.0.pl01 1.3.0
1.3.2 1.3.4 1.3.6.pl01 1.3.6 1.3.8 1.4.0 1.4.2.pl01 1.4.2 1.4.4 1.4.6
• libcdaudio:
– ARM: 0.99.12.p2 0.99.12
– MIPS: 0.99.12-4 0.99.12-7 0.99.12
• libcddb:
– ARM: 1.3.0 1.3.2
• libcdio:
– ARM: 0.82 0.83 0.90 0.92 0.93
• libcrypto:
– X86: 0.9.6 0.9.7 0.9.8
– MIPS: 1.0.0
• libdatrie:
– ARM: 0.1.2 0.1.4 0.2.10 0.2.1 0.2.2 0.2.3 0.2.4 0.2.5 0.2.6 0.2.8 0.2.9
• libdc1394:
– ARM: 2.1.0 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.2.1 2.2.3 2.2.4
• libdca:
– ARM: 0.0.5
• libdiscid:
– ARM: 0.3.0 0.3.2 0.4.1 0.5.0 0.5.1 0.5.2 0.6.1
• libdmtx:
– ARM: 0.7.4
• libdv:
– ARM: 1.0.0
• libdvbpsi:
– ARM: 0.1.6 0.1.7 0.2.0 0.2.1 0.2.2 1.1.0 1.1.1 1.1.2 1.3.0
• libdvdcss:
– ARM: 1.2.10 1.2.11 1.2.12 1.2.13 1.2.9 1.3.0 1.4.0
• libebml:
– ARM: 0.7.8 0.8.0 1.0.0 1.2.0 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.3.0 1.3.1 1.3.3 1.3.4
– MIPS: 0.7.8-2 0.8.0-1 1.0.0-1 1.2.0-1 1.2.1-1 1.2.2-2 1.3.0-1 1.3.1-1 1.3.3-2
1.3.4-1 1.3.4
• libexif:
– ARM: 0.6.16 0.6.17 0.6.19 0.6.20 0.6.21
– MIPS: 0.6.17-1 0.6.19-1 0.6.20-1 0.6.21-3
• libffi:
– ARM: 3.0.10 3.0.11 3.0.12 3.0.13 3.0.8 3.0.9 3.1 3.2.1
• libgssglue:
9– ARM: 0.1 0.3 0.4
• libid3tag:
– ARM: 0.15.1b
– MIPS: 0.15.1b
• libieee1284:
– ARM: 0.2.11
• libisoburn:
– ARM: 1.1.6 1.1.8 1.2.0 1.2.2 1.2.4 1.2.6 1.2.8 1.3.0 1.3.2 1.3.4 1.3.6.pl01
1.3.6 1.3.8 1.4.0 1.4.2 1.4.4 1.4.6
• libisofs:
– ARM: 0.6.12 0.6.14 0.6.16 0.6.18 0.6.20 0.6.22 0.6.24 0.6.26 0.6.28 0.6.30
0.6.32 0.6.34 0.6.36 0.6.38 0.6.40 1.0.0 1.0.2 1.0.4 1.0.6 1.0.8 1.1.0 1.1.2 1.1.4
1.1.6 1.2.0 1.2.2 1.2.4 1.2.6 1.2.8 1.3.0 1.3.2 1.3.4 1.3.6 1.3.8 1.4.0 1.4.2 1.4.4
1.4.6
• libjpeg:
– MIPS: 7.0.0 8.0.0 8.0.1 8.0.2 8.3.0 8.4.0 9.0.0 9.1.0 9.2.0
– X86: 7.0.0 8.0.0 8.0.1 8.0.2 8.3.0 8.4.0 9.0.0 9.1.0 9.2.0
• liblo:
– ARM: 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28
• libmcrypt:
– ARM: 2.5.8
– MIPS: 2.5.8-2 2.5.8
• libmms:
– ARM: 0.6.4
• libmodplug:
– ARM: 0.8.7 0.8.8.1 0.8.8.2 0.8.8.3 0.8.8.4 0.8.8.5 0.8.8
• libmp4v2:
– ARM: 2.0.0
• libmpdclient:
– ARM: 2.10 2.8 2.9
• libmpeg2:
– ARM: 0.4.1 0.5.1
• libmspack:
– ARM: 0.0.20060920alpha 0.2alpha 0.3alpha 0.4alpha 0.5alpha
• libnet:
– ARM: 1.1.6
• libnova:
– ARM: 0.12.1 0.12.2 0.12.3 0.13.0 0.14.0 0.15.0
• libogg:
– ARM: 1.1.3 1.1.4 1.2.0 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.3.0 1.3.1 1.3.2
– MIPS: 1.1.3 1.1.4 1.2.0 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.3.0 1.3.1 1.3.2
• liboil:
– ARM: 0.3.17
• libpciaccess:
– ARM: 0.10.4 0.10.5 0.10.6 0.10.8 0.10.9 0.11.0 0.12.0 0.12.1 0.12.902 0.13.1
0.13.2 0.13.3 0.13.4 0.13
• libpipeline:
– ARM: 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 1.2.6 1.3.0 1.3.1 1.4.0 1.4.1
• libpng:
– X86: 2.1.0.12 3.1.2.12 3.1.2.18 3.1.2.1 3.1.2.27 3.1.2.32 3.1.2.37 3.1.2.5
3.1.2.8 3.43.0 3.44.0 3.50.0
– ARM: 1.2.25 1.2.29 1.2.30 1.2.31 1.2.32 1.4.3 1.4.4 1.4.5 1.4.8 1.5.10 1.5.11
1.5.12 1.5.13 1.5.14 1.5.15 1.5.1 1.5.7 1.5.8 1.5.9 1.6.10 1.6.12 1.6.13 1.6.14
1.6.15 1.6.16 1.6.18 1.6.19 1.6.20 1.6.21 1.6.22 1.6.23 1.6.24 1.6.25 1.6.26
1.6.2 1.6.3 1.6.5 1.6.6 1.6.7 1.6.8 1.6.9
– MIPS: 1.5.10 1.5.11 1.5.12 1.5.13 1.5.14 1.5.15 1.6.10 1.6.12 1.6.13 1.6.14
1.6.15 1.6.16 1.6.18 1.6.19 1.6.20 1.6.21 1.6.22 1.6.23 1.6.24 1.6.25 1.6.26
1.6.2 1.6.3 1.6.5 1.6.6 1.6.7 1.6.8 1.6.9
• libraw1394:
– ARM: 2.0.4 2.0.5 2.0.7 2.1.0 2.1.1 2.1.2
– MIPS: 2.0.4 2.0.5 2.0.7 2.1.0 2.1.1 2.1.2
• libsamplerate:
– ARM: 0.1.2 0.1.3 0.1.4 0.1.6 0.1.7 0.1.8 0.1.9
• libsigsegv:
– ARM: 2.10 2.4 2.6
• libsndfile:
– ARM: 1.0.21 1.0.22 1.0.23 1.0.24 1.0.25 1.0.26 1.0.27
• libssl:
– MIPS: 1.0.0
– X86: 0.9.6 0.9.7 0.9.8 1.0.0
• libtar:
– MIPS: 1.2.20
• libtiff:
– ARM: 4.0.7
– MIPS: 3.8.2 3.9.0 3.9.1 3.9.2 3.9.4 3.9.5 4.0.0 4.0.1 4.0.2 4.0.3 4.0.4 4.0.6
4.0.7
• libupnp:
– ARM: 1.6.10 1.6.12 1.6.13 1.6.14 1.6.15 1.6.16 1.6.17 1.6.18 1.6.19 1.6.20
1.6.6 1.6.8 1.6.9
• libvisual:
– ARM: 0.4.0
• libvncserver:
– ARM: 0.9.10 0.9.1 0.9.7 0.9.8.1 0.9.8.2 0.9.8 0.9.9
• libxmi:
– ARM: 1.2
• libytnef:
– ARM: 1.5 1.8
• libz:
– ARM: 1.2.8
– MIPS: 1.0.4 1.1.2 1.1.3 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.8
– X86: 1.0.8 1.0.9 1.1.0 1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3 1.1.4 1.2.0.1 1.2.0.2 1.2.0.3 1.2.0.4
1.2.0.5 1.2.0.6 1.2.0.7 1.2.0.8 1.2.0 1.2.1.1 1.2.1.2 1.2.1 1.2.2.1 1.2.2.2 1.2.2.3
1.2.2.4 1.2.2 1.2.3.1 1.2.3.2 1.2.3.3 1.2.3.4 1.2.3.5 1.2.3.6 1.2.3.7 1.2.3.8
1.2.3.9 1.2.3 1.2.4.1 1.2.4.2 1.2.4.3 1.2.4.4 1.2.4.5 1.2.4 1.2.5.2 1.2.5.3 1.2.5
1.2.6.1 1.2.6 1.2.7.1 1.2.7.2-motley 1.2.7.3 1.2.7
• libzip:
– ARM: 0.10.1 0.10 0.11.1 0.11.2 0.11 0.8 0.9.3 0.9 1.0.1 1.1.2 1.1.3
• lzo:
– ARM: 1.08 2.08 2.09
– MIPS: 1.08-5 1.08-8 2.08-3 2.09-1
• opus:
– ARM: 1.0.1 1.0.2 1.0.3 1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3 1.1
– MIPS: 1.0.1 1.0.2 1.0.3 1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3 1.1
• pcre:
– ARM: 8.39
• uClibc:
– MIPS: 0.9.27 0.9.28 0.9.29 0.9.30.1 0.9.33.2
• xz:
– ARM: 5.0.0 5.0.1 5.0.2 5.0.3 5.0.4 5.0.5 5.0.6 5.0.7 5.0.8 5.2.0 5.2.1 5.2.2
– MIPS: 5.0.0 5.0.1 5.0.2 5.0.3 5.0.4 5.0.5 5.0.6 5.0.7 5.0.8 5.2.0 5.2.1 5.2.2
